On Uniqueness of Equilibria in the CAPM by Hens, Thorsten et al.
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich
Working Paper Series
ISSN 1424-0459
Working Paper No. 39
On Uniqueness of Equilibria in the CAPM
(This paper replaces the paper
"Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria in the CAPM")
Thorsten Hens, Jörg Laitenberger and Andreas Löffler
July 2000
ON UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIA IN THE CAPM
By Thorsten Hens, Jo¨rg Laitenberger and Andreas Lo¨ffler∗
July 2000
This paper replaces the paper ”Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria in the CAPM”
Institut fu¨r Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universita¨t Zu¨rich, Switzerland;
thens@iew.unizh.ch
and
Price Waterhouse Coopers Corporate Finance, Olof–Palme–Str. 35, 60439 Frankfurt/Main,
Germany.
and
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Freie Universita¨t Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195
Berlin, Germany; al@dcf-verfahren.de.
∗Lo¨ffler acknowledges financial support from DAAD, Bonn. We thank Lutz Hendricks and two anonymous
referees for very helpful comments.
1
2Abstract
In the standard CAPM with a riskless asset we give a sufficient condition for unique-
ness.This condition is a joint restriction on the agents’ endowments and their preferences
which is compatible with non-increasing absolute risk aversion and which is in particular
satisfied with constant absolute risk aversion. Moreover in the CAPM without a riskless
asset we give an example for multiple equilibria even though all agents have constant
absolute risk aversion.
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31. Introduction
Nowadays the classical two–period Capital Asset Pricing Model is one of the cornerstones of
modern finance. Developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), it is widely
used both by practitioners and theoreticians, since it gives us a managable and attractive
way of thinking about risk and required return on a risky investment. Given this succesful
theory one is forced to ask why the question of uniqueness of equilibria was not intensively
investigated for a long time. It should be clear that without uniqueness the CAPM looses much
of its relevance: if there are many equilibria, on which can investors base their investment
decisions? And what is the ”correct” risk premium for risky assets? In this paper we give
a condition for uniqueness of CAPM-equilibria which is based on the risk aversion and the
endowments of the investors. Our condition is compatible with non-increasing absolute risk
aversion.
It was Nielsen (1988) who showed that the static CAPM equilibrium (even in a very
simplified example) need not to be unique. There may be several equilibria, all with identical
expected total returns, covariances, utility functions, and initial distributions of cash flows. In
every CAPM equilibrium, risk is measured in the same way (via the capital market line) but
the risk premium is indeterminate. And even worse as it was recently shown by Bottazzi et al.
(1998), the situation described by Nielsen is by no means exceptional. For every risky market
portfolio there are CAPM economies that have arbitrarily many equilibria. This result shows
that one cannot expect a general theorem establishing uniqueness for a broad class of CAPM
economies.
Up to now only special cases are known in which the static CAPM possesses a unique
equilibrium: for example, if utility functions are quadratic or if investors have expected utility
functions with constant absolute risk aversion and returns are jointly normally distributed.
Nielsen (1988) considered the question of uniqueness but he did not give a result that relies
on economic fundamentals, i.e. endowments or utility functions, alone. Dana (1999) seems
to be the most general result on uniqueness. Unfortunately, her criterion is based on the
assumption of an additively separable mean–variance utility function which is difficult to
interpret economically. Furthermore, Dana assumes the mean–variance utility function to be
concave. It can be shown that concavity of the mean–variance utility together with Dana
(1999) assumption implies non-decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Our purpose is to give a uniqueness result that relies only on economically interpretable
assumptions. We show that under non-increasing absolute risk aversion a joint restriction on
utility functions and endowments implies uniqueness in the CAPM with a riskless asset. It
is a common contention that non-increasing absolute risk aversion is a plausible property of
utility functions of investors.For example, experiments (see Levy (1964)) as well as empirical
studies (see Dalal & Arshanapalli (1993)) have shown that constant relative risk aversion is
very plausible. This gives evidence for decreasing absolute risk aversion. In particular, our
condition is satisfied if all investors exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
Merton (1973) has developed a continuous time version of the CAPM. Recently Karatzas
4et al. (1990) obtained a uniqueness result for this continuous time model which is based on
the assumption of relative risk aversion being smaller than one. But this condition is not
compatible with µ–σ utility functions as was shown by Lo¨ffler (2000). Hence, the idea of
Karatzas et al. (1990) cannot be applied to the static CAPM.
Our uniqueness result relies heavily on the existence of a riskless asset. This assumption
is far from being trivial. Indeed, we will show in section 4 that even in the case when
all investors exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, examples of economies with multiple
equilibria can be constructed for the CAPM without a riskless asset. The only condition
we know which guarantees uniqueness of equilibria even for the CAPM without a riskless
asset has been given in Allingham (1991). When the CAPM utility functions are derived
from expected utility maximization and when asset returns are normally distributed, then
agents do not only exhibit constant absolute risk aversion but represented in a mean-variance
diagram indifference curves are parallel straight lines.
It should be noted why uniqueness of CAPM–equilibria cannot be derived as a corollary
of the uniqueness results known in the standard general equilibrium model (cf. Arrow & Hahn
(1971) or Mas–Colell et.al. (1995)). After all the CAPM can be seen as a general equilibrium
model with two goods: mean and variance. However, in some important aspects the CAPM
differs from the standard general equilibrium model. One of the ’goods’, the variance, is not
desired and for the other good there are no non–negativity constraints. In particular, there are
no non–negativity constraints on the set of attainable payoffs. Introducing such constraints in
the CAPM would rule out the important case of normally distributed returns, and moreover,
would conflict with the Tobin separation property, a key property of the CAPM. Moreover,
in contrast to the standard differentiable approach to general equilibrium theory Mas–Colell
(1985), indifference curves in the CAPM intersect with the boundary of the consumption set.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the general CAPM in L2(ν),
and then derives an equivalent two commodity representation. Section 3 gives the uniqueness
result for the CAPM with a riskless asset. Section 4 presents an example of a CAPM–
economy without a riskless asset that exhibits multiple equilibria even though all investors
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
2. The model
The model is essentially a static two-period Capital Asset Pricing Model in a General
Equilibrium framework, as it is presented in most modern Finance textbooks, see e.g. Duffie
(1988) or more recently LeRoy & Werner (2001). There are two dates t = 0, 1. At date 1
several possible states of the world s can occur. The uncertainty about these states is common
among all agents, and described by a probability space (S,S, ν). Consumption takes place
only at date 1.
A consumption bundle x is a real–valued measurable function on (S,S, ν). For technical
reasons, the consumption set will be restricted to the set of measurable functions with finite
5variance:
L2(ν) = {x|E (x2) <∞}
where E (x) :=
∫
S x(s) dν is the expected value of x. L
2(ν) is a Hilbert–space, when endowed
with the probability adjusted scalar product x · y = E(xy) = ∫S x(s)y(s) dν and with the
Norm ||x|| =√E (x2). The covariance-bilinearform Cov (x, y) = E (xy)− E (x) E (y) and the
variance–operator Var (x) = Cov (x, x) are defined as usual.
Endowments of the agents are vectors in L2(ν). In order to shift consumption among
states, the agents may trade assets at date zero, that is, before uncertainty has resolved. An
asset is a contract that promises the delivery of some amount of the good in each state of the
world at date one. This amount can be negative in some states, as it is for instance when
the payoffs of the securities are normally distributed. It is modeled as well as a vector in
L2(ν). The set of existing non–redundant assets is denoted by Y . There can be potentially
an infinite number of securities, but for notational convenience we will always use the symbol
’
∑
’ when summing over Y . In any case Y is supposed to be closed. There are no short sales
constraints, such that the agents may buy or sell any amount of these assets that they can
afford. The set of possible trades of date-1-consumption is given by the linear combinations
of securities in Y , thus by < Y >, the space spanned by Y . The following portfolio η plays a
key role in the CAPM. It is the portfolio which solves the minimization problem
min{Var (z)|E (z) = 1, z ∈< Y >} > 0.
This portfolio exist because Y is closed. The following Lemma summarizes two properties of
η:
Lemma 1
1. The vector η is collinear to the orthogonal projection of the riskless asset 1 onto <
Y >,where orthogonality is meant with respect to the probability adjusted scalar product.
2. For all y in < Y >: Cov (η, y) = Var (η)E(y)
Proof. 1. Let ηˆ be the projection of 1 onto < Y >.
ηˆ = arg min {||z − 1||2 | z ∈< Y >}
= arg min {|E (z2)− 2E (z) + 1| | z ∈< Y >}
= arg min {|Var (z) + E (z)2 − 2E (z) + 1| | z ∈< Y >}
= arg min {Var (z) + (E (z)− 1)2 | z ∈< Y >}.
Since both Var (z) ≥ 0 and (E(z)− 1)2 ≥ 0 one can conclude
ηˆ = arg min {Var (z) | E (z) = E (ηˆ), z ∈< Y >}
= E(ηˆ)η.
62. Consider the space spanned by η and y. Clearly, since y ∈< Y >,
η = arg min {Var (z) | E (z) = 1, z ∈< η, y >}.
Any z ∈< η, y > is of the form z = α1η+α2y with some α ∈ R2. The above minimization
can be written as a Lagrange–problem of the following form:
minαTΩα, subject to αy¯ = 1,
where Ω =
(
Var (η) Cov (η, y)
Cov (η, y) Var (y)
)
and y¯ =
(
1
E (y)
)
are the variance-covariance–
matrix and the vector of expected returns, respectively. The solution of this problem
computes as α = λΩ−1y¯ with some Lagrange multiplier λ > 0. Since at the minimum
z = η, it must be that α2 = 0. But this implies
−Cov (η, y) + Var (η) E (y) = 0.
A price p of a payoff–stream x in < Y > can be identified by virtue of the Riesz represen-
tation theorem as a vector in < Y >. There are I agents i = {1, . . . , I} described by their
utility functions ui and their endowments ωi. The following assumptions are made:
The preference of every agent i can be represented by a mean–variance utility function,
that is ui(x) = vi(µ(x),σ(x)) for all x in L2(ν), with vi : R × R+ → R increasing in µ(x) =
E(x), decreasing in σ(x) =
√
Var (x), continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave.
The endowments are ’spanned’: for all i, ωi ∈< Y >. Equivalently, there exist portfolios
αi ∈ RJ such that ωi = ∑j αijyj . Furthermore, for the market portfolio ω = ∑i ωi, it is
assumed that E(ω) = 1 and Var (ω) > Var (η).
An agent’s maximization problem has the form:
maxui(x)
subject to p · x ≤ p · ωi and x ∈< Y > . (2.1)
The definition of an equilibrium of the asset market is standard:
Definition 1
An equilibrium of the CAPM–economy is an allocation x∗,i ∈< Y > for every i ∈ I and a
price p ∈< Y >, such that:
1. x∗,i maximizes (2.1) for all i ∈ I
2.
∑
I x
∗,i = ω
Note that although in general all agents are allowed not to exhaust their budget, in
equilibrium they will have to do so, because market clearing requires demand to be equal to
supply.
7Existence of equilibria has been proved in the CAPM with a riskless asset under assump-
tions weaker than those we stated above e.g. by Nielsen (1990), Allingham (1991), Dana
(1999) and Hara (1998). For the case without a riskless asset under some additional assump-
tions Nielsen (1990), Allingham (1991) and Laitenberger (1998) give existence results. In any
case, if there is an equilibrium, the next proposition shows that it features a lot of power-
ful properties. Based on these properties we follow Dana (1999) and transform the general
CAPM into a simple equivalent two commodity equilibrium model. We have taken this part
of our paper from Laitenberger (1998). To the best of our knowledge the transformation from
L2 to R2 has so far only been given for the case of a riskless asset1.
Proposition 1
In an equilibrium, the following relations hold: for every agent i, there exist φi ∈ R, ψi ∈ R+
such that
x∗,i = φiη + ψiω, (2.2)
and φ0,ψ0 ∈ R such that:
p = φ0η + ψ0ω. (2.3)
Moreover in equilibrium, it must be p · ω < p · η.
Proof. 2 1. In equilibrium the agents consume their whole budget.
This must be so, because in equilibrium markets clear and in the aggregate∑
i
p · x∗,i =
∑
i
p · ωi. (2.4)
If any agent had p · x∗,i < p · ωi and all other agents respect their budget constraint p · x∗,j ≤
p · ωj , then (2.5) could not hold.
2. Let xi be the equilibrium choice of agent i at the price p. Decompose xi = yi + zi,
where yi ∈< η, p > and zi is orthogonal to < η, p >. Since zi⊥p, p · yi = p · xi and yi lies in
the budget frontier of agent i. Since zi⊥η, η · xi = η · yi, but this implies
Cov (η, xi) + E (xi) = Cov (η, yi) + E (yi)
and with Lemma 2 part 2. this implies E (xi) = E (yi).
Since yi and zi are orthogonal, E(yizi) = 0, and with E(zi) = 0, it immediately follows
that Cov (yi, zi) = 0, and this implies
Var (xi) = Var (yi) + Var (zi) ≥ Var (yi).
Since xi is most preferred, it must be
0 = Var (zi) = E ((zi)2)− (E (zi))2 = E((zi)2),
1See however LeRoy & Werner (2001) for a similar transformation in a more restrictive setting.
2For the special case of utilities derived from quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of wealth func-
tions, a similar proof has been given by Geanakoplos & Shubik (1990).
8This in turn implies zi = 0.
Thus for all agents, there are real numbers λi, ξi, such that
xi = λiη + ξip.
3. In equilibrium
∑
i x
i =
∑
i λ
iη +
∑
i ξ
ip = ω. Thus
p =
1∑
i ξ
i
ω −
∑
i λ
i∑
i ξ
i
η,
if
∑
i ξ
i )= 0. The inverse, ∑i ξi = 0, is excluded, since it was assumed that ω and η are not
collinear.
Writing p in the above form, one concludes:
xi =
(
λi − ξ
i∑
i ξi
∑
i
λi
)
η +
ξi∑
i ξ
i
ω.
4. Assume p · ω ≥ p · η. Let xi = φiη + ψiω be the choice of agent i, and assume
ψi > 0. Take y = (φi + ψi)η. Clearly E (y) = E (xi) and Var (y) < Var (xi). Furthermore
p · y = (p · η)(φi + ψi) ≤ φi(p · η) + ψi(p · ω) = p · xi. Thus xi cannot be maximizing agent i’s
utility function. Therefore ψi ≤ 0 for all i. But then ∑i ψi ≤ 0, which is impossible, because
at equilibrium
∑
i x
i = ω and therefore
∑
i ψ
i = 1. Thus it must be: p · ω < p · η.
5. Assume xi = φiη + ψiω with ψi < 0. Then y = (φi + ψi)η has E (y) = E (xi) and
Var (y) < Var (xi) and since p ·ω < p ·η, p ·y = (p ·η)(φi− |ψi|) < φi(p ·η)− |ψi|(p ·ω) = p ·xi.
Therefore xi cannot be agent i’s choice, and thus ψi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I.
Given the insights of the last proposition, information about the equilibrium can be gained
by solving a simplified problem, namely one in which investors do not choose their portfolio
among all securities in Y , but only among η and ω. The investors’ new problem then has the
following shape:
maxui(φη + ψω)
subject to p · ηφ+ p · ωψ ≤ p · ηφ¯i + p · ωψ¯i,
(2.5)
where ω¯i = ηφ¯i + ωψ¯i is the orthogonal projection of ωi onto < η,ω >. φ¯i and ψ¯i can be
computed as:
ψ¯i =
Cov (η,ωi)− Cov (ω,ωi)
Var (η)−Var (ω) , φ¯
i = E(ωi)− ψ¯i.
It will turn out that it is more practical to use instead of the base elements η and ω, the
equivalent base consisting of η and ω−η. The use of (ω−η) has several advantages. First, for
the general perception of the facts, it is very intuitive to have one base element closely related
to the entity ’standard deviation’. Secondly, since some computing will have to be done, it is
9obviously very helpful to have E (ω − η) = Cov (η,ω − η) = 0. Finally, the main reason for
the use of (ω−η) as a base element is that due to the last line in proposition 1 in equilibrium
its price has to be negative, so that we can use the price normalization p · (ω − η) = −1.
From now on we use the following notation. The space of allowed asset-trades is spanned
by η and σˆ = 1||ω−η||2 (ω − η). Given the assumptions on ω, one has:
E (σˆ) = 0, Var (σˆ) = 1.
For a consumption vector x = αη + βσˆ, the following holds:
E (x) = α, Var (x) = Var (η)α2 + β2.
The endowment of agent i is given as
ω¯i = α¯iη + β¯iσˆ,
with α¯i = φ¯i + ψ¯i and β¯i = ||ω − η||2ψ¯i.
An equilibrium in these new notations is then defined as:
Definition 2 An equilibrium of the µ − σ-economy is an allocation α∗,i,β∗,i ∈ R2 for every
i ∈ I and a price r∗ ∈ R, such that:
1. α∗,i,β∗,i maximizes
vi(α,
√
Var (η)α2 + β2)
subject to r∗α− β ≤ ¯r∗αi − β¯i,
(2.6)
2.
∑
I α
∗,i = 1,
∑
I β
∗,i = ||ω − η||2.
This definition concludes the presentation of the model.
3. Uniqueness of equilibria in the CAPM with a riskless
asset
In this section we assume that there is a riskless asset, i.e. 1 ∈< Y >. In this case η = 1
and the price of η has to be positive as can be shown by a simple no–arbitrage argument, see
Bottazzi et al. (1998). We can then use the price normalization p · η = 1. Now the decision
problem derived in the previous section can be simplified to
max
(µ,σ)
vi(µ,σ)
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s.t. µ− qσ ≤ µ¯i − qσ¯i
where µ¯i = E(ωi) and σ¯i =
√
Cov (ωi,ω). The discussion of the various conditions for
uniqueness will be in terms of the slope of the indifference curves in the (µ,σ)– diagram,
Si(µ,σ) := −∂σv
i(µ,σ)
∂µvi(µ,σ)
.
This slope is a measure of the investor’s risk aversion, as Nielsen (1988) and Lajari and
Nielsen (1994) have shown: Define a simple portfolio problem as a decision problem where an
investor maximizes utility over portfolios formed by one riskless and one risky asset. Lajari
and Nielsen (1994) then show that non–increasing risk aversion is equivalent to the property
that in every simple decision problem the demand of the risky asset is non–increasing in
income. Moreover, as we will show, how Si(µ,σ) changes with µ is the key determinant for
the monotonicity of the agent’s optimal choice σi as a function of q. The following terminology
is quite useful.
Definition 3
A mean–variance utility function exhibits non increasing (non decreasing) risk aversion if for
all σ ≥ 0 the slope of its indifference curves are non increasing (non decreasing) functions in
mean. It exhibits constant absolute risk aversion if this slope is constant.
The next Lemma shows how the slope of an agent’s risk aversion ∂µSi(µi,σi) determines
the slope of his demand for risk ∂qσ(q).
Lemma 2(individual monotonicity)
Let (µi(q),σi(q)) ∈ argmax vi(µ,σ) s.t. µ− qσ ≤ µ¯i − qσ¯i. Then
(a) ∂qσi(q) ≥< 0 iff ∂µS
i(µi(q),σi(q))(σi(q)− σ¯i) ≤> 1 and
(b) ∂qσi(q) > 0 if ∂µSi(µi(q),σi(q))(µi(q)− µ¯i(q)) ≤ 0.
Proof
By assumption higher mean is preferred, hence the budget restriction holds with equality.
Therefore, consider
max
σ≥0 v
i(µ¯i − qσ¯i + qσ,σ).
The first order condition for an optimal solution is
(FOC) ∂µvi(µ¯i − qσ¯i + qσ,σ)q + ∂σvi(µ¯i − qσ¯i + qσ,σ) = 0.
Yielding
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dσ
dq
=
[(∂µvi) + (∂2µvi)q(σ − σ¯i) + (∂µ∂σvi)(σ − σ¯i)]
−[((∂σ∂µvi) + ∂2µviq)q + (∂µ∂σvi)q + (∂2σvi)]
Note that by strict quasi–concavity of vi the denominator in this expression is strictly
positive. Furthermore, since (∂µvi) > 0 it is obtained that
dσ
dq
> 0 iff 1 +
[(∂2µvi)q + (∂µ∂σvi)](σ − σ¯i)
(∂µvi)
> 0..
Substitution of q = −∂σvi∂µvi from the (FOC) and using the identity
∂µSi = − [(∂µ∂σv
i)(∂µvi)−(∂2µvi)(∂σvi)]
(∂µvi)2
proves our claim (a).
To see the second claim (b), substitute (σ − σ¯i) = (µ−µ¯i)q from the budget equation into
claim (a), recognizing that q > 0.
!
¿From Lemma 3 we get the following condition for uniqueness of equilibria in the CAPM:
Theorem 1
When there is a riskless asset, CAPM equilibria are unique if every agent has on the one hand
non–decreasing (on the other hand non–increasing) absolute risk aversion for mean–variance
combinations with mean smaller (resp.larger) than the expected value of her endowments
and variance smaller(resp. larger) than the covariance of her endowments and the market
portfolio.
Proof
For each q > 0, every agent i = 1, ..., I can be in one of the following situations:
∂µSi ∂qσi(q) result follows
(1) σi(q) < σ¯i, µi(q) < µ¯i 0 ≥ 0 from (a) or from (b)
(2) σi(q) < σ¯i, µi(q) ≥ µ¯i ≤ 0 > 0 from (b)
(3) σi(q) ≥ σ¯i, µi(q) < µ¯i ≤ 0 > 0 from (a)
(4) σi(q) ≥ σ¯i, µi(q) ≥ µ¯i ≤ 0 > 0 from (a) or from (b)
Thus every individual demand function is strictly monotone and therefore ”market de-
mand”
I∑
i=1
σi(q) is strictly monotone. Hence there is at most one equilibrium. From the
existence results mentioned above follows that there is at least one equilibrium. Therefore,
there is a unique equilibrium.
!
- Figure 1 (see end of text) -
Figure 1 shows a set of indifference curves satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. In
the area (1), for all σ the slope of the indifference curves are non–decreasing as a function of
µ. In areas (2), (3) and (4) for all σ this slope is non–increasing in µ.
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The condition used in Theorem 1 is a joint restriction on individual’s resources and their
preferences. The following Corollary 1 demonstrates uniqueness of equilibria as being derived
from an assumption on vi only.
Corollary 1
CAPM equilibria are unique if all agents have constant risk aversion.
Proof
In the case of constant risk aversion, ∂µSi = 0 for all i = 1, ..., I. Hence both conditions
of Lemma 1 are can be applied to obtain this result.
!
Corollary 1 establishes uniqueness in the CAPM for the case of constant absolute risk
aversion without any distributional assumptions on the payoffs thus generalizing the well
known uniqueness result for the case of exponential utility functions and normally distributed
returns.
An interesting observation, which was pointed out to us by an anonymous referee of this
journal, is that constant absolute risk aversion holds if and only if the mean variance utility
functions vi(µ,σ) are quasi–linear, i.e. if they can be represented as vi(µ,σ) = µ− hi(σ) for
some convex function hi.3
This observation relates the uniqueness of CAPM–equilibria in this case nicely to the
results on uniqueness found in the general equilibrium literature since quasi–linearity is a
well known condition for uniqueness of general equilibria. However, without a riskless asset
quasi–linearity does not need to follow from constant absolute risk aversion. And indeed in
the next section we will demonstrate by means of an example that without a riskless asset
CAPM–equilibria need not be unique even though all agents have constant absolute risk
aversion.
4. Multiplicity of equilibria in the CAPM without a
riskless asset
The framework in this section is the same as in section 3, except that we assume now 1 )∈ Y .
In the following we will demonstrate that condition given in Theorem 1 is not sufficient
to guarantee a unique equilibrium in the CAPM with risky assets only. We will construct an
3The ”if” part of this claim follows directly from this functional form by applying it to the definition of
constant absolute risk aversion, i.e. to ∂µS
i(µ,σ) = 0. To see the ”only if” part note that constant absolute
risk aversion implies that the mean-variance–preference ordering of any two points in L2 or equivalently
in the mean–variance diagram remains unchanged by addition of any scalar multiple of the riskless asset
to both points. Hence for any two points (µ1,σ1),(µ2,σ2) such that v
i(µ1,σ1) = v
i(µ2,σ2) we get that
vi(0,σ1) = v
i(µ2 − µ1,σ2). That is to say since the LHS is independent from µ the RHS must also be
independent from µ thus there must exist some convex function hi such that v
i(µ,σ) = µ− hi(σ).
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economy with two assets and two constantly risk averse investors that exhibits (at least) two
equilibria.
To make things easier we assume Var (η) = 1. Recall from the transformation outlined in
section 2 that any investor i solves the maximization problem
max vi
(
α,
√
(α)2 + (β)2
)
s.t. α− qβ ≤ α¯i − qβ¯i. (4.7)
This formulation already reveals the intuition of our example. Although the utility function in
µ and σ is quasi-linear, the transformed problem in the (α, β) space will not be quasi-linear.
Hence, multiple solutions might exist and it remains to show the details. To this end we
choose the endowments of the investors as
(α¯1, β¯1) = (0.546, 0.975), (α¯2, β¯2) = (0.454, 0.025). (4.8)
Notice that both endowments add to one which will be important later.
The utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, hence the utility vi are of
the functional form
vi(µ,σ) = µ− hi(σ)
where hi is a strictly convex and strictly monotone function. For our example it will be
enough to show that the first derivative is positive and monotone at two points since then hi
can easily be extended on R+. In particular we assume that
h′1(0.17) = 1.2 h
′
1(0.172) = 1.21
h′2(1.152) = 0.3718 h
′
2(1.17) = 0.6667
To derive the equilibria consider the first order conditions according to (4.7), i = 1, 2
1− 2αh′i(α2 + β2)− λq = 0
−2βh′i(α2 + β2) + λq = 0.
The budget constraint must be binding at equilbrium if λi > 0 which is implied by 1 −
2αh′i(α2 + β2) > 0. The first order conditions can therefore be simplified to
1− 2αh′i(α2 + β2)
2βh′i(α2 + β2)
= q > 0
which will ensure non–satiation at equilibrium. If markets clear and since endowments add
to one this condition can be written using the optimal portfolio (α∗,β∗) of investor one
1− 2α∗h′1(α∗2 + β∗2)
2β∗h′1(α∗2 + β∗
2)
=
1− 2(1− α∗)h′2((1− α∗)2 + (1− β∗)2)
2(1− β∗)h′2((1− α∗)2 + (1− β∗)2)
= q∗ > 0. (4.9)
14
Our example will be complete if we determine the optimal portfolio (α∗,β∗) of investor
one and show that (1− α∗, 1− β∗) is optimal for investor two or, which is the same, satisfies
(4.9). The following portfolios and prices will do
(α∗(1),β
∗
(1)) = (0.4, 0.1), (1− α∗(1), 1− β∗(1)) = (0.6, 0.9), q∗(1) = 0.16667,
(α∗(2),β
∗
(2)) = (0.11, 0.6), (1− α∗(2), 1− β∗(2)) = (0.89, 0.4), q∗(2) = 0.75806.
Using our assumption on the first derivative of h1 and h2 it is now straightforward to
verify that both equilibria satisfy our condition (4.9). Moreover at these equilibria all budget
constraints are indeed satisfied with equality. We therefore have constructed a CAPM with
at least two equilibria.
Finally note that if the functions hi(σ) were of the functional form ciσ2 for some positive
constant ci, then our construction of multiple equilibria does not work because the single
parameter ci is not sufficient to determine two values of h′i. And indeed in this case, as
Allingham (1991) has demonstrated, equilibria are unique even when there is no riskless
asset.
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